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Abstract. CompCert is a formally verified compiler that generates com-
pact and efficient PowerPC, ARM and x86 code for a large and realistic
subset of the C language. However, CompCert foregoes using Static Sin-
gle Assignment (SSA), an intermediate representation that allows for
writing simpler and faster optimizers, and that is used by many com-
pilers. In fact, it has remained an open problem to verify formally an
SSA-based compiler middle-end. We report on a formally verified, SSA-
based, middle-end for CompCert. Our middle-end performs conversion
from CompCert intermediate form to SSA form, optimization of SSA
programs, including Global Value Numbering, and transforming out of
SSA to intermediate form. In addition to provide the first formally veri-
fied SSA-based middle-end, we address two problems raised by Leroy [22]:
giving a simple and intuitive formal semantics to SSA, and leveraging the
global properties of SSA to reason locally about program optimizations.
1 Introduction
Static single assignment Static single assignment (SSA) form [16] is an in-
termediate representation where variables are statically assigned exactly once.
Thanks to the considerable strength of this property, the SSA form simplifies
the definition of many optimizations, and improves their efficiency, as well as the
quality of their results. It is therefore not surprising that many modern compil-
ers, including GCC and LLVMC [23], rely heavily on SSA form, and that there
is a vast body of work on SSA. However, the simplicity of SSA form is decep-
tive, and designing a correct SSA-based middle-end compiler has been fraught
with difficulties. In fact, it has been a significant challenge to design efficient,
semantics-preserving, algorithms for converting programs into SSA form, or op-
timizing SSA programs, or even transforming programs out of SSA form.
Verified Compilers Compiler correctness aims at giving a rigorous proof that
a compiler preserves the behavior of programs. After 40 years of a rich history,
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the field is entering into a new dimension, with the advent of realistic and me-
chanically verified compilers. This new generation of compilers was initiated with
CompCert [22], a compiler that is programmed and verified in the Coq proof as-
sistant and generates compact and efficient assembly code for a large fragment
of the C language. Leroy’s CompCert has been rightfully acclaimed as a tour de
force, but it foregoes relying on an SSA-based middle end. In [22], Leroy reports:
Since the beginning of CompCert we have been considering using SSA-
based intermediate languages, but were held off by two difficulties. First,
the dynamic semantics for SSA is not obvious to formalize. Second, the
SSA property is global to the code of a whole function and not straight-
forward to exploit locally within proofs.
and adds: “A typical SSA-based optimization that interests us is global value
numbering”. However verifying GVN is a significant challenge, and its formal
verification has remained beyond current state-of-the-art in certified compilers.
The structural properties of SSA are well-identified in the literature, and
some proofs of SSA-based analyses and transformations can be found [16, 14, 8].
What is missing in those works is the semantic counterparts of those properties.
The proofs are traditionally based on how the SSA-based algorithms work and
the information they compute (i.e. properties of the CFG). In particular, the
semantic properties and invariants established by the SSA generation algorithm
are never expressed precisely. This is probably due to the lack of a definition of a
semantics for SSA that would be both formal and close to the intuitive definition
given in the seminal papers [1, 16].
Static Single Assignment meets verified compilers The thesis of our work
is that a compiler can be realistic, verified and still rely on a SSA form. To sup-
port our thesis, we provide the first verified SSA-based middle-end. Rather than
programming and proving a verified compiler from scratch, we have programmed
and verified a SSA-based middle-end compiler that can be plugged into Com-
pCert at the level of RTL. Figure 1 describes the overall architecture. Our middle-
end performs four phases: (i) normalization of RTL program; (ii) transformation
from RTL form into SSA form; (iii) optimization of programs in SSA form, in-
cluding Global Value Numbering (GVN) [1]; (iv) transformation of programs
from SSA form to RTL form; and relies on CompCert for the transformation
from C to RTL programs prior to SSA conversion, and from RTL programs to
assembly code after conversion out of SSA—our point is to program a realistic
and verified SSA-based middle-end, rather than to demonstrate that SSA-based
optimizations dramatically improve the efficiency of generated code.
We validate our compiler middle-end with a mix of techniques directly inher-
ited from CompCert. We resort to translation validation [28, 27]—increasingly
favored by CompCert [34, 35]—for converting programs into SSA form and for
GVN. Specifically, we program in Coq verified checkers that validate a poste-
riori results of untrusted computations, and we implement in OCaml efficient
algorithms for these computations; we rely on Cytron et al algorithm [16] for
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Fig. 1: The SSA Middle-end
computing minimal SSA form, and on Alpern et al iteration strategy [1] for com-
puting a numbering in GVN. In contrast, the normalization of the RTL program,
and the conversion out of SSA are directly programmed and proved in Coq. In
addition, our work addresses the two issues raised by Leroy [22]. First, we give
a simple and intuitive operational semantics for SSA; the semantics follows the
informal description given in [16], and does not require any artificial state in-
strumentation. Second, we define on SSA programs two global properties, called
strictness and equational form, allowing to conclude reasonably directly that the
substitutions performed by GVN and other optimizations are sound.
Summarizing, our work provides the first verified SSA-based middle-end, the
first formal proof of an SSA-based optimization, as well as an intuitive semantics
for SSA. It thus serves as a good starting point for further studies of verified and
realistic SSA-based compilers.
This paper supersedes [5]. The main differences are a proof of completeness
for the SSA translation validator, a description of the implementation of the
type inference, a more detailed description of the conversion out of SSA and
more precise measurements of the GVN optimizer efficacy. The companion Coq
development is available online [15].
Contents The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief primer on
SSA and CompCert. In Section 3, we recall the syntax and semantics of RTL,
the CompCert IR at which we plug our middle-end, and we explain the pre-
processing of RTL prior to the middle-end. Section 4 defines the SSA language
used by our middle-end. Conversion to and out of SSA forms are presented in
Section 5 and 8 respectively. Section 7 presents SSA-based optimizations. The
correctness of these optimizations rely on a core lemma, which we present in
Section 6. We conclude with experimental results in Section 9 and related work
in Section 10. Throughout the paper, we use Coq syntax for our definitions and
results. Statements occasionally involve some notions that are not introduced
formally. In such cases, names are generally chosen to be self-explanatory (for
instance, not_wrong_program); in other cases, we forego giving precise defini-
tions as they are not needed to understand the paper (for instance, the types
chunk and addressing are unspecified in the definition of state). Our formal-
ization makes an extensive use of inductive definitions, which are introduced in
Coq using the keyword Inductive. Inductive definitions are used both for in-
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Fig. 2: Example program and its SSA forms
troducing new datatypes, e.g. the type of RTL instructions in Figure 4, and for
introducing inductive relations, e.g. the operational semantics of RTL instruc-
tions in Figure 4. In the latter case, the declarations are written according to
the pattern
Inductive R : A→ B→ Prop :=
| Rule1: ∀ a b, ...→ R a b
| Rule2:...→ R a b
meaning that the relation R is a binary predicate (indicated by Prop, the type
of propositions in Coq) whose arguments are of types A and B respectively. The
relation R is defined by two rules Rules1 and Rules2, describing when the propo-
sition (R a b) holds for elements a and b (the hypotheses are indicated by dots).
2 Background
2.1 Static Single Assignment form
Static Single Assignment is an intermediate representation in which variables
are statically assigned exactly once, thus making explicit in the program syntax
the link between the program point where a variable is defined and read.
Converting into SSA form For straighline code, one simply tags each variable
definition with an index, and each variable use with the index corresponding
to the last definition of this variable. For example, [x := 1; y := x + 1;x :=
y − 1; y := x] is transformed into [x0 := 1; y0 := x0 + 1;x1 := y0 − 1; y1 := x1].
The transformation is semantics-preserving, in the sense that the final values of
x and y in the first snippet coincide with the final values of x1 and y1 in the
second snippet.
On the other hand, one cannot transform arbitrary programs into seman-
tically equivalent programs in SSA form solely by tagging variables: one must
insert φ-functions to handle branching statements. Figure 2 shows a program
a), and a program b) that corresponds to a SSA form of a). In program a), the
value of variable x read at node 9 either comes from the definition of x at entry
or at node 6. In program b), these two definitions of x are renamed into the
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unique definition of x0 and x2 and merged together by the φ-function of x3 at
entry of node 9. The precise meaning of a φ-block depends on the numbering
convention of the predecessor nodes of each junction point. In Figure 2 b) we
make explicit this numbering by labelling the CFG edges. For example, node 3
is the first predecessor of point 9 and node 6 is the second one. The semantics
of φ-functions is given in the seminal paper by Cytron et al [16]:
If control reaches node j from its kth predecessor, then the run-time
support remembers k while executing the φ-functions in j. The value of
φ(x1, x2, . . .) is just the value of the kth operand. Each execution of a
φ-function uses only one of the operands, but which one depends on the
flow of control just before entering j.
Maximal, minimal and pruned SSA There may be several SSA forms for
a single program CFG. Figure 2 gives alternative SSA forms for a same initial
program. In the maximal SSA form (Figure 2b), a φ-function is inserted for
all program variables, at each join point. As the number of φ-functions directly
impacts the quality of the subsequent optimizations—as well as the size of the
SSA form—it is important that SSA generators for real compilers produce an
SSA form with a minimal number of φ-functions.
The minimal SSA form is informally specified as follows: a φ-function is
needed for a given variable at join points that can be reached by at least two
distinct definitions of that variable in the initial program. This is captured by
the notion of convergence point of CFG paths starting at two distinct definition
points of a variable (the join operator in [16]).
Consider the program examples in Figures 2a and 2c. Two definitions of y
(at point 1 and 4) can reach the join point 3: a φ-instruction is required at node
3 in Program 2c. On the other hand, there is only one definition of x (the initial
implicit definition of x) that reaches that point in Program 2a and no φ-function
is inserted for x at point 3 in Program 2c.
Algorithmically, it is more efficient to determine the placement of φ-functions
of minimal SSA using the equivalent notion of dominance frontier.
Definition 1 (Dominance relation). A node i in a CFG dominates another
node j if every path from the entry node of the CFG to j contains i. The domi-
nance is said to be strict if additionally i 6= j.
Definition 2 (Dominance frontier). For a node i of a CFG, the dominance
frontier DF (i) of i is defined as the set of nodes j such that i dominates at least
one predecessor of j in the CFG but does not strictly dominates j itself. The
notion is extended to a set of nodes S with DF (S) =
⋃
i∈S DF (i).
Definition 3 (Iterated dominance frontier). The iterated dominance fron-
tier DF+(S) of a set of nodes S is limi→∞DF i(S), where DF 1(S) = DF (S)
and DF i+1(S) = DF (S ∪DF i(S)).
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Fig. 3: Common sub-expression elimination (CSE) using GVN
Efficient algorithms for computing the dominance frontiers rely on an effective
representation of the dominance relation, the dominator tree. It relies on the
notion of immediate dominator.
Definition 4 (Immediate dominator). The immediate dominator of a node
j, written idom(j) is the closest strict dominator of j on every path from the
entry node to j. It is uniquely determined.
Definition 5 (Dominator tree). It is defined as follows. The start node is the
root of the tree. Each node’s children are the nodes it immediately dominates.
In a minimal SSA program generated by Cytron et al.’s algorithm, every φ-
function of an instance xi of an original variable x appears in a junction point j
if and only if j belongs to the iterated dominance frontier of the set of definition
nodes of x in the original program.
However, one can achieve more compact SSA forms by observing that, at
any junction point, dead variables need not to be defined by a φ-function. The
intuition is captured by the notion of pruned SSA form: a program is in pruned
SSA form when the φ-functions appear at the iterated dominance frontiers and
for each φ-function of an instance xi of an original variable x at a junction point
j, x is live at j in the original program (there is a path from j to a use of x
that does not redefine x). Compared to minimal SSA (Figure 2c), pruned SSA
detects that the φ-function for y at point 9 can be removed. Finally, semi-pruned
SSA forms can be seen as a good trade-off between a minimal SSA form that is
not compact enough, and pruned SSA forms that are sometimes too costly to
compute (pathological CFGs with can make the liveness analysis intractable).
The liveness analysis used for semi-pruned SSA is local to basic blocks: it is
hence less precise, but more efficient.
SSA-based optimizations The SSA form simplifies the definition of many
common optimizations; for instance, copy propagation algorithms can just walk
through a SSA program, identify statements of the form x := y, and replace ev-
ery use of x by y. Furthermore, several optimizations are naturally formulated on
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SSA. One typical SSA-based optimization is Global Value Numbering (GVN) [1],
which assigns to variables an identifying number such that variables with the
same number will hold equal values at execution time. The effectiveness of GVN
lies in its ability to compute efficiently numberings that identify as many vari-
ables as possible. Advanced algorithms [1, 11] allow to compute efficiently such
numberings. We briefly explain one such numbering in Section 7.
Figure 3 illustrates how GVN can be used to eliminate redundant computa-
tion. The left program is the original code; in this program, for each i, xi and
yi are assigned the same value number. Hence, the evaluation of y1 + 1 (resp.
y1 + 2) is a redundant computation when assigning y2 (resp. y3), and one can
transform the program into the semantically equivalent one shown on the right
of the figure. The strength of the analysis lies in its ability to reason about φ-
functions, which allows it to infer the equality x2 = y2. This is only possible
because the numbering is global to the whole program; in fact, any block-local
analysis would fail to discover the equality x2 = y2.
2.2 CompCert
CompCert is a realistic formally verified compiler that generates PowerPC, ARM
or x86 code from source programs written in a large subset of C. CompCert
formalizes the operational semantics of dozen intermediate languages, and proves
for each phase a semantics preservation theorem.
Preservation theorems are expressed in terms of program behaviors, i.e. finite
or infinite traces of external function calls (a.k.a. events) that are performed
during the execution of the program, and claim that individual compilation
phases preserve behaviors.
A consequence of the theorems is that for any C program p that does not go
wrong, and target program tp output by the successful compilation of p by the
compiler compcert_compiler, the set of behaviors of p contains all behaviors
of the target program tp. The formal theorem is:
Theorem compcert compiler correct: ∀ (p: C.program) (tp: Asm.program),
(not wrong program p ∧ compcert compiler p = OK tp)→
(∀ beh, exec asm program tp beh→ exec C program p beh).
Each phase of the compiler is formally proved relying on simulation tech-
niques, and the formal development of CompCert provides the general correct-
ness theorems of the simulation diagrams. Some parts of the CompCert compiler
are not directly proved in Coq. This is the case of the register allocation [22],
which is based on a graph coloring algorithm. The graph coloring algorithm
is written in OCaml, and then validated a posteriori by a checker written in
Coq. The correctness proof of the checker (stating that if a coloring is accepted
by the validator, then this is indeed a valid coloring) ensures this compilation
phase has the same guarantees than a transformation that would be written and
proved directly in Coq, with the additional benefit of abstracting from complex
implementation details and heuristics.
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3 The RTL language
Our middle-end is plugged at the level of the RTL language in CompCert. This
section presents briefly this language. RTL stands for Register Transfer Lan-
guage. It is a CFG-based three-address like representation of the code, where
most of the existing optimisations are performed (constant propagation, removal
of redundant cast, tail call detection, local value numbering and a register allo-
cation that includes copy propagation).
3.1 Syntax and semantics
The syntax and semantics of RTL is given in Figure 4. An RTL program is
defined as a set of global variables, a set of functions, and an entry node. Func-
tions are modelled as records that include a function signature fn_sig, a CFG
fn_code of instructions over pseudo-registers. The CFG is not a basic-block
graph: it partially maps each CFG node to a single instruction, and we stick to
this important design choice of CompCert. As explained by Knoop et al [19], it
allows for simpler implementations of code manipulations and simplifies correct-
ness proofs of analyses or transformations, without impacting too much their
efficiency.
The RTL instruction set includes arithmetic operations (Iop), memory loads
(Iload) and stores (Istore), function calls (Icall), conditional (Icond) and
unconditional jumps (Inop), and a return statement (Ireturn)— we do not
discuss here jumptables and other kinds of function calls: call to a function
pointer stored in a register, tail calls, and built-in functions. All instructions
take as last argument a node pc denoting the next instruction to be executed;
additionally, all instructions but Inop take as arguments pseudo-registers of type
reg, memory chunks, and addressing modes.
The type of states is defined as the tagged union of regular states, call states
and return states (Figure 4). We focus on regular states, as we only expose here
the intra-procedural part of the language. A regular semantic state (State) is
a tuple that contains a call stack (representing the current pending function
calls), the current function description and stack pointer (to the stack data
block, a part of the global memory where variables dereferenced in the C source
program reside), the current program point, the registers state (a mapping of
local variables to values) and the global memory. The semantics also includes a
global environment (of type genv) mapping function names and global variables
to memory addresses.
The operational behavior of programs is modelled by the relation step be-
tween two semantic states (see Figure 4), and a trace of events; all instructions
except function calls do not emit any event, hence the transitions that they
induced are tagged by the empty event trace . We briefly comment on the
rules: (Inop pc′) branches to the next program point pc′. (Iop op args res pc′)
performs the arithmetic operation op over the values of registers args (written
rs##args), stores the result in res (written rs#res← v), and branches to pc′.
The instruction (Iload chk addr args res pc′) loads a chk memory quantity
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Inductive instr :=
| Inop (pc: node)
| Iop (op: operation) (args: list reg) (res: reg) (pc: node)
| Iload (chk:chunk) (addr:addressing) (args: list reg) (res: reg) (pc: node)
| Istore (chk:chunk) (addr:addressing) (args:list reg) (src: reg) (pc: node)
| Icall (sig: signature) (fn:ident) (args: list reg) (res: reg) (pc: node)
| Icond (cond: condition) (args: list reg) (ifso ifnot: node)
| Ireturn (or: option reg).
Definition code := PTree.t instr. type of code graph
Record function := {
fn sig: signature; function signature
fn params: list reg; parameters
fn stacksize: Z; activation record size
fn code: code; code graph
fn entrypoint: node entry node
}.
Inductive state :=
| State (stack: list stackframe) call stack
(f: function) current function
(sp: val) stack pointer
(pc: node) current program point
(rs: regset) register state
(m: mem) memory state
| Callstate (stack: list stackframe) (f: fundef) (args: list val) (m: mem)
| Returnstate (stack: list stackframe) (v: val) (m: mem).
Inductive step: genv→ state→ trace→ state→ Prop :=
| ex Inop: ∀ ge s f sp pc rs m pc’,
fn code f pc = Some(Inop pc’)→
step ge (State s f sp pc rs m)  (State s f sp pc’ rs m)
| ex Iop: ∀ ge s f sp pc rs m pc’ op args res v,
fn code f pc = Some(Iop op args res pc’)→
eval operation sp op (rs##args) m = Some v→
step ge (State s f sp pc rs m)  (State s f sp pc’ (rs#res←v) m)
| ex Iload: ∀ ge s f sp pc rs m pc’ chk addr args res a v,
fn code f pc = Some(Iload chk addr args res pc’)→
eval addressing sp addr (rs##args) = Some a→
Mem.loadv chk m a = Some v→
step ge (State s f sp pc rs m)  (State s f sp pc’ (rs#res←v) m)
Fig. 4: Syntax and semantics of RTL (excerpt)
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0 if x >= 0
1 y := 0
2 Inop
3 if y < x   
4 y := 1+ y
5 Inop 7 Inop
6 x := 1
8 Inop
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RTL 
normalization
0 if x >= 0
1 y := 0
3 if y < x   
4 y := 1+ y
6 x := 1
9 return x
Fig. 5: An RTL program and its normalized version
from the address determined by the addressing mode addr and the values of the
args registers, stores the memory quantity just read into res, and branches to
pc′.
3.2 Normalizing RTL syntax
Before generating the SSA form of an RTL code, we rely on a structural normal-
ization phase of the RTL code (see Figure 1) that we have added to CompCert,
prior to the middle-end proper.
This normalization phase consists of transforming an RTL program into an-
other one, with additional structural constraints on the CFGs of functions. We
normalize an RTL CFG so that the only instruction that can lead to a junction
point is an (Inop pc) instruction. Figure 5 shows an example RTL program and
its normalized version.
This normalization phase has been programmed and proved in Coq. One
could think this normalization phase is quite anecdotal. But this structural con-
straint will carry over the SSA form of RTL programs, and will allow for lighten-
ing the formal development of our SSA middle-end. As will be pointed out in the
next sections, this impacts the formal definitions of the syntax of SSA, but also
greatly simplifies its semantics. This also lightens the definition and the proof
of our SSA validator, the GVN-based CSE, and the SSA deconstruction. Also,
we take care during this normalization to remove from the function CFG all the
nodes that are not syntactically reachable from the entry node. Having CFGs
with all nodes reachable simplifies many formal definitions, including the one of
dominance. Strictly speaking, an unreachable node is dominated by any other
node in a graph. So, by eliminating such nodes, we also eliminate this corner
case from the definitions.
4 The SSA language
We describe the syntax and operational semantics of the language SSA that
provides the SSA form of RTL programs. We equip the notion of SSA program
with a well-formedness predicate capturing essential properties of SSA forms.
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Definition reg := RTL.reg ∗ idx indexed registers
Inductive instr := ... RTL-like instructions
(operating on SSA.regs)
Inductive phiinstr :=
| Iphi (args: list SSA.reg) (res: SSA.reg). φ-functions
Definition phiblock:= list phiinstr. φ-blocks
Record function := {
fn sig: signature; function signature
fn params: list SSA.reg; parameters
fn stacksize: Z; activation record size
fn code: code; code graph
fn phicode: phicode; φ-blocks graph
fn entrypoint: node entry node
}.
Fig. 6: Syntax of SSA
4.1 SSA programs
Syntax Our definition of SSA program distinguishes between RTL-like instruc-
tions and φ-functions; the distinction avoids the need for unwieldy mappings
between program points when converting to SSA, and allows for a smooth inte-
gration in CompCert. Figure 6 introduces the syntax of SSA.
Compared to RTL functions, SSA functions operate on indexed registers
of type SSA.reg, and include an additional field fn_phicode mapping junction
points to φ-blocks. The latter are modelled as lists of φ-functions, each of the form
(Iphi args res), where res is an indexed register, and args a list of indexed
registers.
We define structural constraints that allow giving an intuitive semantics to
SSA programs. First, we require that the domain of the function fn_phicode
be the set of junction points. Second, we require that all φ-functions in a φ-block
have the same number of arguments as the number of predecessors of that block.
Our last requirement is the normalization criterion of the CFG of SSA functions:
all predecessors of a junction point must be (Inop pc) instructions.
Strict SSA We consider two essential properties of SSA forms: unique defini-
tions and strictness [12]. The unique definitions property states that each register
is uniquely defined, whereas the strictness property states that each variable use
is dominated by the (unique) definition of that variable.
While the two properties are closely related, none implies the other; the
program [y0 := x0;x0 := 1] satisfies the unique definitions property but is not
in strict form whereas the program [x0 := 1;x0 := 2; y0 := x0] is strict but does
not satisfy the unique definitions property.
To formalize these properties, one first defines the type of CFG paths, and
two predicates dom and sdom for dominance and strict dominance. We also prove
many properties of the dominance relation, such as its reflexivity, transitivity,
12 Gilles Barthe, Delphine Demange, and David Pichardie
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Fig. 7: Example (normalized) SSA program – The variable y2 is defined at node
3 (in the φ-block attached to that program point), and used at points 3 and 4.
The variable x2 is defined at node 6 and used at node 8, the second predecessor
of the junction point 9, where x2 is the second argument of the φ-function.
and anti-symmetry. Then, one must define the two predicates def and use of type
SSA.function→ SSA.reg→ node→ Prop such that proposition def f x pc (re-
spectively use f x pc) holds iff the register x is defined (resp. used) at node pc
in the code of the function f. Predicate def is defined in the obvious way. The
definition of use is more involved, because of φ-functions. A variable is used
either by an RTL-like instruction or a φ-function:
Definition use (f:SSA.function) (x:reg) (pc:node) : Prop :=
use code f x pc ∨ use phicode f x pc.
where predicate use_code defines when a variable is used in the RTL-like
code. It is defined straightforwardly: a variable is used if it appears in the right
hand-side of an assignment, in the condition of an Icond instruction, as an
argument of a function call etc. We now explain predicate use_phicode. The
widely adopted convention is to view φ-functions as lazily evaluated. Hence, the
kth argument of a φ-function is used at the kth predecessor of the corresponding
block.
Inductive use phicode : SSA.function→ reg→ node→ Prop :=
| upc intro : ∀ f pc pred k arg args dst phib
(PHIB : fn phicode f pc = Some phib)
(ASSIG : In (Iphi args dst) phib)
(KARG : nth error args k = Some arg) arg is the kth element of args
(KPRED : index pred f pred pc = Some k), pred is the kth predecessor of pc in f
use phicode f arg pred.
This matches the semantics we formally define in Section 4.2: φ-functions
are executed along the edge leading to the φ-block. This definition also allows
reusing the traditional notion of strictness defined on non-SSA programs. Fig-
ure 7 illustrates the definition of predicates def and use.
Using predicates def and use, one can then state the unique definition and
strictness properties, that defines the strict SSA form. We omit the formal defi-
nition of unique_def (it is as expected but rather verbose).
Definition unique def (f: SSA.function) := ...
Definition strict (f: SSA.function) :=
∀ x u d, use f x u→ def f x d→ dom f d u.
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Inductive step: SSA.genv→ SSA.state→ trace→ SSA.state→ Prop :=
| ex Inop njp: ∀ ge s f sp pc rs m pc’,
fn code f pc = Some(Inop pc’)→
¬ join point pc’ f→
step ge (State s f sp pc rs m)  (State s f sp pc’ rs m)
| ex Inop jp: ∀ ge s f sp pc rs m pc’ phib k,
fn code f pc = Some(Inop pc’)→
join point pc’ f→
fn phicode f pc’ = Some phib→
index pred f pc pc’ = Some k→
step ge (State s f sp pc rs m)  (State s f sp pc’ (phistore k rs phib) m)
Fixpoint phistore (k:nat) (rs:SSA.regset) (phib:phiblock) : SSA.regset :=
match phib with
| nil ⇒ rs
| (Iphi args res)::phib ⇒
match nth error args k with
| None ⇒ rs
| Some arg ⇒ (phistore k rs phib)#res ← (rs#arg)
end
end.
Fig. 8: Semantics of SSA (excerpt)
Well-formed SSA programs Finally, the well-formedness of SSA programs
is formally defined by the following predicates (the Record must be interpreted
as a conjunction):
Record wf ssa function (f:SSA.function) : Prop := {
fn ssa: unique def f;
fn wf block: block nb args f;
fn strict: strict f;
fn block jp: ∀ jp, join point jp f↔ fn phicode f jp 6= None;
fn norm:∀ jp pc, join point jp f→ jp∈(succs f pc)→ fn code f pc=Some(Inop jp)
}.
The predicate block_nb_args states that φ-functions arguments are consistent
with the number of predecessors of the CFG node holding the block. In the
sequel, we show that the conversion to SSA yields well-formed programs. Besides,
our SSA-based optimizations will assume that the input SSA programs are well-
formed; in turn, each of the transformations must be proved to preserve well-
formedness.
4.2 Semantics
SSA state are similar to RTL states, except that the type of registers and current
function are modified into SSA.reg and SSA.function respectively. We describe
now the semantics of SSA programs.
Exploiting normalization for an intuitive semantics The small-step op-
erational semantics is defined on SSA programs that satisfy the structural con-
straints introduced in the previous paragraph (wf_ssa_function).
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Formally, we define SSA.step as a relation between pairs of SSA states and a
trace of events. The definition follows the one of RTL.step, except for instructions
of the form (Inop pc′), where one distinguishes whether pc′ is a junction point
or not. In the latter case, the semantics coincide with the RTL semantics, i.e.
the program point is updated in the semantic state. If on the contrary pc′ is a
junction point, then one executes the φ-block attached to pc′ before the control
flows to pc′.
Executing φ-blocks on the way to pc′ avoids the need to instrument the
semantics of SSA with the predecessor program point, and crisply captures the
intuitive meaning given to φ-blocks by Cytron et al (see Section 2). Note in
particular that the normalization ensures that the predecessor of a junction point
is an Inop instruction. This greatly simplifies the definition of the semantics (φ-
block can only be executed after an Inop), and subsequently the proofs about
SSA programs.
Parallel execution of φ-blocks Following conventional practice, φ-blocks are
given a parallel (big-step) semantics. In fact, the SSA generation algorithm en-
sures, by construction, that the φ-functions arguments are never assigned by a
distinct φ-function in the same block. So this parallel semantics seems to be of
little help. But later optimizations will exploit this semantics, that makes explicit
the independence of φ-arguments with regards to φ-function destinations [18, 7].
The semantics of φ-blocks is formally defined with phistore (Figure 8).
When reaching a join point pc′ from its kth predecessor, we update the reg-
ister set rs for each register res assigned in the φ-block phib with the value
of register arg in rs (written rs#arg), where arg is the kth operand in the
φ-function of res (written nth_error args k = Some arg). With the same no-
tations, phistore satisfies, on well-formed SSA functions, a parallel assignment
property:
∀ arg res, In (Iphi args res) phib→
nth error args k = Some arg→ (phistore k rs phib)#res = rs#arg
5 Translation validation of SSA generation
Modern compilers typically follow the algorithm by Cytron et al [16] to generate
a minimal SSA form of programs in almost linear time w.r.t. the size of the
program. The algorithm proceeds in four steps:
(i) Build the CFG dominator tree using the algorithm of [21]
(ii) Compute dominance frontiers (bottom-up traversal of the dominator tree)
(iii) φ-functions are placed at iterated dominance frontiers of RTL variables
(iv) Rename definitions and uses of RTL variables with the correct indexes
(top-down traversal of the dominator tree).
Programming efficiently the algorithm in Coq and proving formally its cor-
rectness is a significant challenge—even verifying formally Step (i) requires to
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formalize a substantial amount of graph theory. Instead, we provide a new val-
idation algorithm that checks in linear time that an SSA program is a correct
SSA form of an input RTL program. The algorithm is complete w.r.t. minimal
SSA form, and can be enhanced by a liveness analysis to handle pruned and
semi-pruned SSA forms, as presented in Section 2.1. In order to be used in a
certified compiler chain, we also show that our validator is sound: it ensure the
preservation of behaviors.
Translation validation of SSA conversion is performed in two passes. The
first pass performs a structural verification on programs: given a RTL function f
and a SSA function tf, it verifies that tf satisfies all clauses of well-formedness
except strictness, and that the code of f can be recovered from its SSA form tf
simply by erasing φ-blocks and variable indices—the latter property is captured
formally by the proposition structural_spec f tf. The second pass relies on a
type system to ensure strictness and semantics-preservation. Overall the pseudo-
code of the validator is
Definition SSA validator (f: RTL.function) (tf: SSA.function) (Γ: gtype): bool :=
if (check blocks are wf tf) (* ensures block_are_wf tf *)
&& (check blocks are at jp tf) (* ensures block_jp tf *)
&& (check normalized tf) (* ensures normalization *)
&& (check unique def tf) (* ensures unique_def tf *)
&& (check structural spec f tf) (* ensures structural_spec f tf *)
then (is well typed f tf Γ)
else false
where is_well_typed f tf returns true when the function is well-typed with
respect to the typing Γ (defined below) in our type system for SSA.
5.1 Type system
The basic idea of our type system is to track for each variable its most recent
definition; this is achieved by assigning to all program points a local typing, i.e.,
an element of ltype = RTL.reg→ idx; we let γ range over local typings. Then,
the global typing of an SSA function tf is an element of gtype = node→ ltype;
we let Γ range over global typings. The type system is structured in three layers.
The lowest layer checks that RTL-like instructions make a correct use of vari-
ables. The middle layer checks that CFG edges are well-typed. Finally, the third
layer of the type system defines the notion of well-typed function.
Throughout this section, we use Figure 9 as a running example (an RTL
program, its pruned SSA form and its type mapping).
Liveness As explained in Section 2, a liveness information can be used to mini-
mize the number of φ-functions in a SSA program. Specifically, φ-blocks need to
assign only live variables. Hence, our type system is parametrized by a function
live modelling a liveness analysis result, a mapping from CFG nodes to sets of
registers: (live i) is the set of registers that are live at node i.
Formally, the type system does not need to know much about the liveness
information, and how it is computed. We only demand that the live function
16 Gilles Barthe, Delphine Demange, and David Pichardie
27/04/11 8
27/04/11
4
0 if x  >= 0
1 y := 0
2 Inop
3 if y < x   
4 y := 1+ y
5 Inop 7 Inop
6 x := 1
8 Inop
9 return x
x := !(x  ,x  )23 0
0 if x >= 0
1 y := 0
2 Inop
3 if y < x   
4 y := 1+ y
5 Inop 7 Inop
6 x := 1
8 Inop
9 return x
0
1
2
2 0
23 3
Gen SSA
y  := !(y  ,y  )2 13
2
1
2
1
22 Gilles Barthe, Delphine Demange, and David Pichardie
hypothesis ASSIG in Figure 9: we have to show that variable x and (x, (Γ pc′ x))
have the same value in the new register states, and this is the case, thanks to con-
straints we impose on the format of φ-blocks, as well as the hypothesis USES in
Figure 9: if the kth argument of the φ-instruction is (x, j), then it means that
(Γ pc x) = j, and we can conclude using the agreement of register states at pc.
All other cases are treated similarly in the full formalization, except for executing a
function return, where we need to use some invariants about register states of the caller
just before executing the function call (available in the match stackframe predicate).
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
B Proof sketch of wt strict
Theorem wt_strict: ∀ f tf Γ live,
wf_live f live → wt_function tf Γ live →
∀ (xi : SSA.reg) (u d : node), use tf xi u → def tf xi d → dom tf d u.
Under the hypotheses, suppose (use tf xi u) and (def tf xi d). Suppose that xi
is (x, i). The result is immediate when u = d. Now, suppose they are different, and that
¬ (dom tf d u). Then, there exists a path p from the entry of tf to u that does not go
through d. But (use tf xi u), thus (Γ u x) = i (which we show as an auxiliary lemma).
It remains to show that x is live at u in order to conclude a contradiction by using the
following lemma:
Lemma gamma_def: ∀ f tf Γ live, wt_function f tf live Γ → wf_live f live →
∀ p pc x i d, path tf (fn_entrypoint tf) p pc → def tf (x,i) d →
(Γ pc x) = i → x ∈ (live pc) → In d (pc::p).
Del: use code et use ph-
icode When (use code tf xi u), we simply use the fact that (wf live f live) and (structural spec f tf).
Now, if (use phicode tf xi u), we use the well-typedness of the edge from u to the
φ-block at, say, pc. The register (x, i) is an argument, and hence a version for x is
assigned in the block. The type system specification demands that x is live at pc. We
hence know x is live at u, thanks to the wf incl field of (wf live f live) record, and
the fact that x cannot be assigned at pc (the function is normalized).
C Stuff
pc (Γ pc x) (Γ pc y) (live pc)
0 0 0 {x}
1 0 0 {x}
2 0 1 {x, y}
3 0 2 {x, y}
4 0 2 {x, y}
5 0 3 {x, y}
6 0 0 {x}
7 0 2 {x}
8 2 0 {x}
9 3 0 {x}
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Fig. 9: An RTL program, its pruned SSA form and a valid typing information
satisfies two properties: (i) if a variable is used at a program point, then it should
be live at this point and (ii) a variable that is live at a given program point is, at
the predecessor point, either live or assigned. For a function f, the conjunction
of these two properties is denoted by the Coq record (wf_live f live):
Record wf live (f: RTL.function) (live: node→ Regset.t):= {
wf live use: ∀ pc x, use code f x pc→ x ∈ (live pc)
wf live incl: ∀ pc pc’ x,
is edge f pc pc’→ x ∈ (live pc’)→
x ∈ (live pc) ∨ assigned code f pc x ;
}.
Our type system is able to handle different SSA forms through appropriate
instantiations of live. Our formalization provides support for minimal SSA and
pruned SSA forms, respectively by defining live as the trivial over-approximation
(for each point, it is the set of all the RTL variables), and the result of a standard
liveness analysis [2]. One could also support semi-pruned forms, by instantiating
live as the result of the block-local liveness analysis of [10]. All these three
liveness information can be shown to be well-formed.
Example 1 (Liveness information). In the last column of the table in Figure 9,
we give the liveness information calculated about the variables of the initial
RTL function. This information will be used by the validator for validating the
pruned SSA form of the program in Figure 9. For instance, the variable y is live
at node 3, since it is used at node 3. This variable is however dead (i.e. not live)
at point 1 because it is defined (but not used) at this point of the program: it is
hence redefined before it is used. At point 6, neither x or y are live. Indeed, the
variable x is defined (but not used) at this point (thus redefined before being
used at point 9) and the variable y is not used on any path starting at point 6.
Typing rules for instructions The type system for instructions checks that
RTL-like instructions make a correct use of variables, and that they do not
redefine parameters; its formal definition is given in Figure 10.
Judgments are of the form {γ} ins {γ′}; intuitively, the judgment is valid if
each variable x is used in ins with the index (γ x), and γ′ maps each variable
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to its last definition after execution of ins. The typing rules are formalized as
an inductive relation wt_instr; we briefly comment on some rules.
Several rules correspond to instructions that do not define variables, so the
input and output local typings are equal. For such rules, one simply checks
that the instruction makes a correct use of the variables (through use_ok). The
typing rule for (Inop pc) states that for every local typing γ, (Inop pc) makes
a correct use of variables. The typing rule for Icond checks that the variables
used in the guard are consistent with the local typing input
In the case of the instruction Iop, which defines the variable (r, i), the output
local typing is γ[r← i], i.e. the input local typing updated for the initial variable
r. From this program node onwards, the new version for r is the one indexed
with i, and this is the one that should be used later on, until another version
for r is defined.
The type system relies on the following convention for function parameters:
each of them is given a default index dft (in the example of Figure 9, the default
index is 0). The first phase of the validator (check_unique_def) ensures that
parameters are not redefined inside the body of the function.
Example 2 (Typing instructions). We illustrate the typings of instructions with
Figure 9. Consider the input local typing at point 3. The uses of x0 and y2 are
consistent with it, since (Γ 3 x) = 0 and (Γ 3 y) = 2. The definition of x2 at
node 6 makes the local typing change for variable x between nodes 6 and 8: it
changes from (Γ 6 x) = 0 to (Γ 8 x) = 2.
Typing rules for edges and functions The typing rules for edges ensure
that φ-blocks make a correct use of definitions with regards to a global typing Γ .
There are two rules—modelled by the clauses of the inductive relation wt_edge
in Figure 10.
The first rule considers the case where the edge does not end in a junction
point; in this case, typing the edge is equivalent to typing the corresponding
instruction.
The second rule considers the case where the edge ends in a junction point:
the typing rule checks the φ-block attached to it—structural constraints impose
that the instruction is an Inop, so we do not need to type-check the instruction.
There are three constraints:
– USES ensures that the φ-arguments args passed to φ-functions are consistent
with all incoming local typings: its kth argument should be the version of
the initial variable brought by the kth predecessor of the join point. We omit
the formal definition of phiuse_ok
– ASSIG ensures that the output local typing is consistant with the definitions
in the φ-block
– NASSIG ensures that, if the variables is not assigned in the φ-block, then it
means that either it is dead, or the incoming indices for this variable are the
same for all predecessors
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Definition use ok (uses:list SSA.reg)(γ:ltype):= ∀ r i, In (r,i) uses→ γ
r = i.
Inductive wt instr: ltype→ SSA.instr→ ltype→ Prop :=
| wt Inop: ∀ γ s,
{γ} Inop s {γ}
| wt Istore: ∀ γ chk addr args s src,
use ok (src::args) γ →
{γ} Istore chk addr args src s {γ}
| wt Icond: ∀ γ cond args s1 s2,
use ok args γ →
{γ} Icond cond args s1 s2 {γ}
| wt Ireturn some: ∀ γ r,
use ok [r] γ →
{γ} Ireturn (Some r) {γ}
| wt Ireturn none: ∀ γ,
{γ} Ireturn None {γ}
| wt Iop: ∀ γ op args s r i,
use ok args γ →
{γ} Iop op args (r,i) s {γ[r← i]}
| wt Iload: ∀ γ chk addr args s r i,
use ok args γ →
{γ} Iload chk addr args (r,i) s {γ[r← i]}
| wt Icall: ∀ γ sig args s id r i,
use ok args γ →
{γ} Icall sig id args (r,i) s {γ[r← i]}
Inductive wt edge (f:SSA.function)(Γ:gtype)(live:Regset.t):node→ node→ Prop:=
| wt edge not jp: ∀ i j ins
(NOTJP: fn code f i = Some ins ∧ fn phicode f j = None)
(WTI: {Γ i} ins {Γ j}),
wt edge f Γ live i j
| wt edge jp: ∀ i j ins block
(JP: fn code f i = Some ins ∧ fn phicode f j = Some block)
(USES:∀ args r k, In (Iphi args (r,k)) block→ phiuse ok r args (preds f j) Γ)
(ASSIG: ∀ r k, assigned (r,k) block→ r ∈ live ∧ (Γ j r) = k)
(NASSIG: ∀ r, (∀ k, ¬ (assigned (r,k) block))→ (Γ i r = Γ j r) ∨ r 6∈live),
wt edge f Γ live i j.
Definition wt function (f:SSA.function)(Γ:gtype)(live:node→ Regset.t): Prop:=
(∀ i j, is edge f i j→ wt edge f Γ (live j) i j)
∧ (∀ i r, fn code f i = Some (Ireturn r)→ {Γ i} Ireturn r {Γ i})
∧ (∀ p, In p (fn params f)→ ∃ r, p = (r, Γ (fn entrypoint f) r)
∧ (Γ (fn entrypoint f) r) = dft).
Fig. 10: Type system
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Example 3 (Typing φ-functions). In Figure 9, the φ-function for x at point 9
makes correct uses of it because its first argument x0 matches (Γ 7 x) = 0 and
x2 matches (Γ 8 x) = 2. The local typing at node 9 takes into account the
definition of x3 in the block by setting (Γ 9 x) to 3. Moreover, no φ-function is
required for y at node 9 since y 6∈ (live 9), and no φ-function is required for x
at node 3, since (Γ 2 x) = (Γ 5 x).
Finally, a function is well-typed with regards to global typing Γ if the lo-
cal typing induced by Γ at the entry node fn_entrypoint is consistent with
the parameters, and all edges and return instructions are well-typed. Return
instructions do not correspond to any edge, we thus need to add this constraint
explicitely.
5.2 Strictness
All SSA programs accepted by the type system are in strict SSA form. It follows
that only well-formed SSA functions will be accepted by the validator.
Theorem wt strict: ∀ f tf Γ live,
wf live f live→
wt function f tf Γ live→
∀ (xi: SSA.reg) (u d: node), use tf xi u→ def tf xi d→ dom tf d u.
The proof of wt_strict relies on two auxiliary lemmas (explained below)
about local typings for well-typed functions. The first lemma states that if a
variable xk is used at node i, then it must be that (Γ i x = k).
Lemma use gamma : ∀ f tf Γ live,
wf live f live→
wt function f tf live Γ →
∀ x i u, use tf (x,i) u→Γ u x = i.
The second lemma states that, whenever (Γ i x = k), the definition point of
variable xk dominates i.
Lemma def gamma : ∀ f tf Γ live,
wf live f live→
wt function f tf live Γ →
∀ x i d, Γ u x = i→ def tf (x,i) d→ dom tf d u.
Under the hypotheses of wt_strict, suppose that xi is used at point u and
defined at point d. By use_gamma, we get that (Γ u x) = i. We conclude by
applying def_gamma to get that d dominates u.
5.3 Soundness
The SSA generation phase, as any other phase of a formally verified compiler
must be proved correct in the following sense: all behaviors of the SSA form
tf are also behaviors of the corresponding initial RTL function f. In our case,
where tf is generated by the untrusted generator and validated a posteriori, we
have to prove that if the validator accepts the pair f and tf, then all behaviors
of tf are also behaviors of f.
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CompCert already provides the general result that a lock-step forward sim-
ulation implies preservation of behaviors, it is thus sufficient to exhibit such a
simulation, under the assumption that the validator accepts the pair of programs
(i.e. all pairs of RTL and SSA functions in these two programs pass the valida-
tor presented in Section 5.1). Such a simulation consists of the three following
lemmas:
Variable prog:RTL.program.
Variable tprog:SSA.program.
Hypothesis valid OK : SSA validator prog tprog = true.
Lemma match initial states:
∀ s1, RTL.initial state prog s1 →
∃ s2, SSA.initial state tprog s2 ∧ s1 ' s2.
Lemma match final states:
∀ s1 s2 r, s1 ' s2 → RTL.final state s1 r→ SSA.final state s2 r.
Lemma match step :
∀ s1 t s2, RTL.step (genv prog) s1 t s2 →
∀ s′1, s1 ' s′1 → ∃s′2, SSA.step (genv tprog) s′1 t s′2 ∧ s2 ' s′2.
where the binary relation ' between semantic states of RTL and SSA carries
the invariants needed for proving behavior preservation.
Simulation relation In particular, ' should track the correspondance between
the registers of semantics states. To do so, we need to capture the semantics of
local typings, that specify the correspondance between the variables of f and tf.
This corresponds to the following property:
Definition agree (γ:ltype) (rs:RTL.regset) (rs’:SSA.regset) (live:Regset.t):=
∀ r, r ∈ live→ rs#r = rs’#(r, γ r).
This intuitively means that the value of an initial RTL register r is equal to
the value of its current version (r, γ) (determined by the local typing γ) in the
SSA function. The idea is then to require that, after each computation step, the
register states of the RTL and SSA functions agree, with respect to the local
typing at the current program point. Note that we will be able to prove such a
correspondance only for live variable, and that it is actually sufficient for proving
behavior preservation.
Now, defining' only in terms of agreement is not enough to make the proof of
simulation go through. We have to constrain more the way RTL and SSA states
match. For instance, matching states should have the same memory states and
stack pointers. Further, their program counters should be equal. Finally, we add
locally to the relation ' other invariants relative to the function descriptions
of semantic states (e.g. the well-formedness of the SSA function and the well-
typedness of the pair of functions).
Formally, the ' relation is defined with the inductive match_states below,
where we omit, for the sake of brevity, the case for relating semantic states of
function calls.
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Inductive match states : RTL.state→ SSA.state→ Prop :=
| match states reg: ∀ s f sp pc rs m ts tf rs’ Γ live
(STACKS: match stackframes s ts)
(SPEC: wt function f tf Γ live)
(SSA: wf ssa function tf)
(LIVE: wf live f live)
(AGREE: agree (Γ pc) rs rs’ live),
(RTL.State s f sp pc rs m) ' (SSA.State ts tf sp pc rs’ m)
| match states return: ∀ s v m ts
(STACKS: match stackframes s ts),
(RTL.Returnstate s v m) ' (SSA.Returnstate ts v m)
where "s' t" := (match states s t).
Note that we also define a matching relation for stackframes; this relation ba-
sically lifts the invariants of the current functions to the whole callstack of '.
This way, at each function call return, the invariants for the caller are available
through the matching relation over the stackframes of the callee. This avoids
to define (rather clumsily) a global hypothesis on the pair of whole RTL and
SSA programs stating the invariants hold for all the functions composing the
programs.
Proof sketch The proof proceeds by nested case-analysis on the kind of seman-
tic state of s1, the relation ', and intruction at the program point under consid-
eration. We treat here the main cases, which are when and the instructions are
(i) Iop and (ii) Inop when a φ-block is attached at its successor point. Consider
s1 = (RTL.State s f sp pc rs m) and s1′ = (SSA.State ts tf sp pc rs′ m), such
that (agree (Γ pc) rs rs′ (live pc)).
– Suppose (Iop op args res pc′) is the instruction at pc in f. Hence, fmakes a
step towards the state s2 = (RTL.State s f sp pc′ (rs#res← v) m). By the
hypothesis (structural_spec f tf), we know that there is, at point pc in
tf, an instruction (Iop op args′ (res, i) pc′), and syntax normalization en-
sures that pc′ is not a junction point. Hence, no φ-block is attached to it in tf:
the matching state is s2′ = (SSA.State ts tf sp pc′ (rs′#(res, i)← v) m).
In fact both expressions defined by op and respectively args and args′ eval-
uates to the same value v: first, the instruction is well-typed, so that it makes
correct uses of its variables, with regards to (Γ pc). Second, rs and rs′ agree
w.r.t (Γ pc). Finally, all uses are live, by hypothesis on live. Finally, re-
sulting states are still in the relation ', since the update of the local typing
specified by the typing rule of the edge (pc, pc′) takes into account the actual
update of the register states in the semantic step.
– Suppose now (Inop pc′) is the instruction at pc in f, with pc′ a junc-
tion point. In this case, s2 = (RTL.State s f sp pc′ rs m). We here take for
matching state s2′ = (SSA.State ts tf sp pc′ (phi_store k p rs′) m) with
p is the φ-block at pc′ and k is such that index_pred tf pc pc′ = Some k.
To show the resulting states stay in the relation, we prove that executing a
φ-block preserves the agreement between register states (as long at the edge
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(pc, pc′) is well typed. Let x be an RTL variable that is live at pc′. Then, we
know that it is live at pc, by the definition of wf_incl and normalization.
If no version of x is assigned in the block, then we use the agreement between
rs and rs′ at pc. Otherwise, we reason similarly than in the case of Iop.
We first use hypothesis ASSIG in Figure 10: we have to show that variable x
and (x, (Γ pc′ x)) have the same value in the new register states, and this is
the case, thanks to constraints we impose on the format of φ-blocks, as well
as the hypothesis USES in Figure 10: if the kth argument of the φ-function
is (x, j), then it means that (Γ pc x) = j, and we can conclude using the
agreement of register states at pc.
All other cases are treated similarly in the full formalization, except for ex-
ecuting a function call or return. At function call, we have to prove a partial
invariant about the caller (that holds just before calling the function), and the
invariants for the callee. The former will then be used at the callee’s return.
5.4 Completeness of the type system
An essential property of our type system is that it accepts all the SSA programs
generated by the algorithm by Cytron et al [16].
Theorem 1 (Type system completeness). Let f be a normalized RTL func-
tion and let tf be the SSA function generated from f by Cytron et al.’s algorithm.
Then there exists Γ such that SSA validator f tf Γ = true.
Proving this theorem requires to identify some key properties about the al-
gorithm presented in [16], which we recall in the Section 5.4. Given this specifi-
cation, we show in Section 5.4 how to build a global typing, that we prove valid
in Section 5.4.
This proof is not formalized in the Coq proof assistant. It would require for-
malizing the specification in Coq, and proving that the actual running algorithm
satisfies this specification. Hence, we would not need to run the validator any-
more: by the soundness of our type system, we could deduce a full correctness
proof of the SSA generation algorithm a la Cytron.
Specification of Cytron et al.’s algorithm We first review the well-known
characterization of the iterated dominance frontier as a fixpoint of the join op-
erator J , as well as some properties of the Cytron et al.’s algorithm.
Definition 6 (Join operator J). Given a set S of nodes, J(S) is defined to
be the set of all nodes j such that there are two non-empty CFG paths that start
at two distinct nodes in S and converge at j, i.e. they both end at j.
Lemma 1 (Iterated dominance characterization). For any set of nodes
S, the iterated dominance frontier of S, DF+(S) satisfies DF+(S) = J(S ∪
DF+(S)).
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Proof. See [16], page 467. 
Let f be an RTL function, and tf the SSA form generated by Cytron’s
algorithm. For a variable x of f, we write defx the set of definition points of
x in f, and def(x) for the (unique) definition point of the variable in tf. We
express now the way Cytron’s algorithm defines the set of definition points of
the versions of x in tf, and how it determines the right index to use in tf when
x is used at some point in f.
Lemma 2 (Minimal SSA - Definitions). Define Dx = defx ∪ DF+(defx).
Dx is the set of program points where an instance of x is defined in tf, and
DF+(defx) is the set of nodes where a φ-function for x is inserted.
Proof. Theorem 2 in [16], page 468. 
Lemma 3 (Minimal SSA - Absence of φ-function). If no instance of a
variable x is assigned in the φ-block at node n, then a single definition of an
instance of x reaches all predecessors of n, without any other instance of x is
defined in between.
Proof. The set of φ-functions required for the variable x is by definition [16]
J+(defx). We conclude using the definition of the iterated join operator J+. 
Corollary 1. If no instance of a variable x is assigned in the φ-block at node
n, then there exists an instance xk of x whose definition strictly dominates n.
Proof. The definition of xk reaches all predecessors of j, and no instance of x
is defined in between. In particular, xk is defined at a common ancestor of all
the predecessors of j. def(xk) dominates all predecessors of j; it thus dominates
j. 
Lemma 4 (Minimal SSA - Uses). If x is used at point i in f, the variable xk
will be used at point i in tf, where xk is the instance of x such that def(xk) ∈ Dx
is the closest ancestor of i in the dominator tree of f.
Proof. See Lemmas 9 and 10 in [16], pages 473-474. 
Building a witness global typing Let f be an RTL function, and tf the
SSA form generated by Cytron et al’s algorithm. We explain now how to build a
global typing Γ by a depth-first-search (DFS) traversal of the CFG of tf. Each
time we reach a new program point j in the DFS, one of its predecessors i in
the CFG has already been treated and (Γ i) is already defined. To define (Γ j),
we distinguish two cases:
Case 1 If j is not a join point, for every RTL variable x, we define (Γ j x) by
case analysis:
• if no instance of x is assigned at i in tf, then we set Γ j x = Γ i x;
• if some instance xk of x is assigned at i in tf, then we set Γ j x = k;
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Case 2 If j is a join point, for every RTL variable x, we define (Γ j x) by case
analysis on the φ-block b at j:
• if no instance of x is assigned in b, then we set Γ j x = Γ i x;
• if some instance xk of x is assigned in b then we set Γ j x = k.
The global typing given in Figure 9 can actually be computed using this
construction. Some properties about this witness global typing Γ can be derived,
that we will use in the proof of the next paragraph.
Lemma 5 (Witness global typing: properties). If (Γ i x) = k, then there
exists xk such that def(xk) dominates i and any shortest CFG path p from
def(xk) to i (excluded) does not go through another definition of an instance
of x, i.e. a point in Dx.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the construction of Γ .
– Base case. For all variable x, (Γ Entry x) = dft for all x, and their definition
point is the entry point by convention. The condition on shortest paths is
trivial since it is emtpy.
– Induction case. Consider the CFG edge (i, j). We proceed by case analysis
on j:
Suppose j is not a junction point. By definition of Γ , there are two cases:
• (Γ j x) = k because xk is defined at i. Here, i dominates j, and the
shortest path from i to j contains only i and j.
• (Γ j x) = (Γ i x) because no instance of x is defined at point
i. Applying the induction hypothesis, we get that there is xk such
that def(xk) dominates i and the shortest path p from def(xk) to
i does not go through another definition of an instance of x. But i
dominates j. By transitivity of the dominance relation, we get that
def(xk) dominates j. The mininal path [def(xk); . . . ; i; j] does not
contain any other definition of an instance of x because i does not
define a version of x.
Suppose now j is a junction point. There are again two cases.
• (Γ j x) = k because an instance xk is defined in the φ-block at point
j. We conclude by the reflexivity of dominance.
• (Γ j x) = (Γ i x) because no instance of x is defined in the φ-block
at j. Let (Γ i x) = k. Here, the induction hypothesis does not permit
to conclude.
In this case, j is not in the iterated dominance frontier of any point in
defx (Lemma 3). Then, by Corollary 1, we get that def(xk) dominates
j.

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The witness global typing is a correct typing Now we prove that tf is
typable with Γ as defined in the previous section. We first consider that tf has
been generated with a trivial live information full_live, containing at each
program point the set of all the RTL variables.
We consider all edges (i, j) in the CFG of tf, and have to prove that the
property (wf_edge f Γ full_live i j) holds. We postpone the discussion of
typing pruned and semi-pruned SSA versions at the end of the paragraph.
First, we concentrate on verifying that the constraints on the variable defi-
nitions are satisfied. We will check that the typing constraints about variables
uses (predicate use_ok in Figure 10) in a separated lemma.
Lemma 6 (Constraints on definitions). Let (i, j) be an edge in the CFG
of tf. Then (wf_edge f Γ full_live i j) holds except for constraints about
variable uses.
Proof. We distinguish two cases.
– Case 1. If j is not a junction point, then i is the sole predecessor of j in the
CFG of tf, and (Γ j) is defined in terms of (Γ i). In this case, we apply the
rule wt_edge_not_jp.
– Case 2. If j is a junction point. We have to prove that rule wt_edge_jp is
applicable. We consider two cases.
• Case 2.1. If i is the predecessor of j in the DFS traversal, Γ j is defined
in terms of Γ i, and the constraints ASSIG and NASSIG hold by definition
of Γ . Therefore the edge is typable.
• Case 2.2. Let i′ be the predecessor of j in the DFS, and suppose i 6= i′.
We have to prove that ASSIG and NASSIG hold. Let b the φ-block at point
j.
ASSIG Let xk be assigned in b. The live information we use here is
full_live, thus x is live at point j. Additionally, we have (Γ j x) =
k by construction.
NASSIG Let x be an RTL variable such that no instance of x is assigned in
block b. Because we use full_live, we have to show that (Γ j x) =
(Γ i x).
By definition of Γ , we know that (Γ j x) = (Γ i′ x). It is thus
sufficient to prove that (Γ i x) = (Γ i′ x).
If the property would not hold, one could conclude from the Lemma 5
that there exist two distinct points ` and `′ such that a definition of
an instance of x occurs in ` and `′ and there is a path from ` (resp. `′)
that reaches i (resp. i′) without meeting any other point in Dx. This
implies that j ∈ J(Dx) = DF+(defx). This leads to a contradiction,
as it would mean that j holds a φ-node for x (Lemma 2). Therefore,
an instance of x should be assigned by a φ-function in b. This is a
contradiction.
This shows that tf is typable with Γ , except for constraints about uses. 
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Lemma 7 (Variable uses). Let (i, j) be an edge in the CFG of tf. Whenever
an instance xk of x is used at point i in tf, we have (Γ i x = k).
Proof. Suppose that (Γ i x = k′), with k′ 6= k. Then, by Lemma 5, we know
that def(xk′) dominates i. But xk is used at point i. By Lemma 4, we hence know
that def(xk) dominates i. Hence, pk = def(xk) and pk′ = def(xk′) both dominate
i. Therefore, by the property of the dominance relation, either pk dominates pk′
or pk′ dominates pk. We distinguish three cases:
– Case 1. If pk = pk′ , we can conclude directly.
– Case 2. Suppose pk strictly dominates pk′ . In this case, p′k would be between
pk and i in the dominator tree. Then, the closest ancestor of i in the dom-
inator tree that belongs to Dx would be pk′ , and the index used for x at
point i should be, by Lemma 4, p′k. This is a contradiction.
– Case 3. Suppose pk′ strictly dominates pk. Then, by antisymmetry of the
dominance relation, pk does not dominate pk′ . This means that there exists
a CFG path p from the entry to pk′ that does not go through pk.
But (Γ i x) = k′. Thus, by Lemma 5, we know it exists a CFG path p′ from
pk′ to i that never meets another point in Dx.
The concatenation of p and p′ gives us a path from the entry node of the
CFG to i, that never goes through pk. This contradicts the fact that pk
dominates i.

Corollary 2 (Constraints on variable uses). Let (i, j) be an edge in the
CFG of tf. Then the constraints on the variable uses required for predicate
(wf_edge f Γ full_live i j) to hold are satisfied.
Completeness with regards to pruned-SSA form can be shown easily by ob-
serving that both the algorithm and the type system make the same use of the
liveness information (a dead initial variable does not require a φ-function).
5.5 Implementation
For the sake of clarity, we have described a non-executable type checker which
assumes that structural constraints are satisfied. For efficiency reasons, the Coq
implementation of the type system is in fact a bit more complex. In particular,
it performs type inference rather than type checking. Additionally, it performs a
single, linear scan of the program, and checks the list of arguments of φ-functions
only once per junction point, rather than once per incoming edge for a given join
point.
On the benchmarks given in Section 9, our implementation is ten times faster
than a type checker derived naively from the non-executable type system of
Figure10. We now give an overview of the implementation.
The untrusted SSA generator does not actually computes the whole code
of the SSA form of a function. It provides to the type checker the information
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that is strictly necessary. We will call this information a hint; it is made of two
maps. The first maps indicates for each CFG node, the instance index this node
potentially defines. The second map provides the same kind of information but
for φ-blocks: at a given node, it indicates whenever a block is required, and
what index to use for the definition of variables. The signature of the external
generator for SSA is thus the following:
Definition SSA hint := (PTree.t index) ∗ (PTree.t (PTree.t index)).
Variable extern SSA gen: RTL.function→ (node→ Regset.t)→ SSA hint.
Then, given this hint, both the type inference and the code generation will
be performed simulatenously:
Definition type infer:
RTL.function→ (node→ Regset.t)→ SSA hint → option SSA.function.
Since the hint might be incorrect, the type inference may not be able to generate
any SSA function, hence the option type of its result. This type inference builds
a global typing Γ using the SSA hint, in a way that is similar to the algorithm
described in Section 5.4. We then prove that, whenever the inference is successful,
the generated function is well typed in the type system described in Figure 10:
Theorem type infer correct: ∀ f tf live hint,
wf live f live→
type infer f live hint = Some tf→
∃ Γ, SSA validator f tf Γ = true.
Finally, our SSA generation algorithm is described by the following snippet.
Definition ssa gen (f: RTL.function) : option SSA.function :=
let live := (LiveAnalysis f) in
let hint := extern gen ssa f live in
type infer f live hint.
First, a liveness analysis (implemented in Coq) is performed on the RTL func-
tion. This liveness information is shared by the external untrusted SSA generator
(written in OCaml) and the type inference. The external SSA generator com-
putes the information (hint) required for the type inference to perform the actual
SSA code generation, whilst verifying that the validity of the hint.
6 The SSA equational lemma
In this section, we introduce the equation lemma that supports the view of
programs in SSA form as systems of equations. We then illustrate how to reason
about a simple SSA-based optimization, namely copy propagation. Using the
equational lemma, we will be able in Section 7 to formalize and prove correct a
GVN optimization.
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6.1 Equational lemma
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The SSA representation provides an intuitive reading
of programs: one can view the unique definition of a
variable as an equation, and by extension one can view
SSA programs as systems of equations.
Because every assignment creates a new value
name it cannot kill (i.e. invalidate) expres-
sions previously computed from other values.
In particular, if two expressions are textually
the same, they are sure to evaluate the same
result. [9]
For instance, the definitions of x3 and y1 respectively
induce the two equations x3 = y1+1 and y1 = x3+1.
There is however a pitfall: the two equations entail
x3 = x3+2, and thus are inconsistent. In fact, equations are only valid at program
nodes dominated by the definition that induce them, as captured formally by
the equation-lemma of SSA:
Lemma equation lemma : ∀ prog d op args x succ f m rs sp pc s,
wf ssa program prog→
reachable prog (State s f sp pc rs m)→
fn code f d = Some (Iop op args x succ)→
sdom f d pc→
eval operation sp op (rs##args) m = Some (rs#x).
where reachable is a predicate that defines reachable states. In practice, it is
often convenient to rely on a corollary that proves the validity of the defining
equation of x at program points where x is used – thus avoiding reasoning on the
dominance relation. The formal statement of the corollary is obtained by replac-
ing the hypothesis sdom f d pc by the hypothesis use f x pc; the proof of the
corollary intensively uses the strictness property of well-formed SSA programs.
6.2 Application with Copy Propagation
We conclude with a succinct account of applying the corollary to prove the
soundness of copy propagation (CP)—recall that CP will search for copies x := y
and replace every use of x by a use of y. Suppose pc is a program point where
such a replacement has been done. Every time pc is reached during the program
execution, we are able to derive, using the corollary, that rs#y = rs#x, where
rs is the current register state because (i) y is the right hand side of the definition
of x and (ii) pc was a use point of x in the initial program. On non-SSA forms,
the reasoning is more involved since one has to prove that the reaching definition
for x is unique at pc, and that no redefinition of y can occur in between.
7 Validation of Global Value Numbering
This typical SSA-based optimization assigns to variables an identifying number
such that variables with the same number will hold equal values at execution
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Inductive ≡N : reg→ reg→ Prop :=
| GVN refl : ∀ x, ≡N x x
| GVN Iop : ∀ x y pc1 pc2 op args1 args2 pc1’ pc2’
fn code f pc1 = Some(Iop op args1 x pc1’)→ same number N args1 args2→
fn code f pc2 = Some(Iop op args2 y pc2’)→ ≡N x y
| GVN Phi : ∀ x y pc args x args y
fn phicode f pc = Some phib→ same number N args x args y →
(Iphi args x x) ∈ phib→ (Iphi args y y) ∈ phib→ ≡N x y.
Definition GVN spec (N:reg→ reg) : Prop :=
(∀ x y, N x = N y→ param f x→ param f y→ x=y)∧(∀ x y, N x = N y→ ≡N x y).
Fig. 11: Valid numbering
time. Several variations of the optimization have been proposed [1, 11]. They are
generally presented has highly optimised iterative algorithms.
We follows [1] but clearly separate the optimisation into two phases. First, an
untrusted analysis, written in OCaml, computes a numbering of SSA programs
and for each program point where the numbering detects a redundant compu-
tation x := e, it provides a candidate y for replacing the previous operation by
x := y. In a second phase, a validator checks the numbering and the proposed
assignment simplification.
To achieve this separation of concerns it is useful to reconsider GVN from
an abstract interpretation point of view: the analysis computes a fixpoint in
the abstract domain of congruence partitions, where partitions are modelled
as mappings N : reg→ reg that map a register to the canonical register of its
equivalence class (its number). The abstract domain is ordered w.r.t. to a partial
order vGVN that coincides with the reverse inclusion of equivalence kernels—
recall that the equivalence kernel of N is the relation ∼N defined by x ∼ y if
and only if N x = N y.
N1 vGVN N2 iff ∼N1 ⊇ ∼N2
The notion of valid numbering is formally defined in Figure 11. First, we
define for each numbering N the relation ≡N as the smallest reflexive relation
identifying: (i) registers whose assignments share the same operator and corre-
sponding arguments are equivalent w.r.t. N (predicate same_number); (ii) reg-
isters that are defined in the same φ-block with equivalent arguments.Then, for
a numbering N to be valid (see GVN_spec), its equivalence kernel must not con-
tain a pair of distinct function parameters and it must moreover be included in
≡N . The latter ensures the intended post-fixpoint property: if we note nparam the
numbering that associates each register to itself if it is a function parameter and
a default register otherwise, then (GVN_spec N ) is equivalent to F (N ) vGVN N
with F the operator defined by F (N ) = nparam ∩ ≡N .
GVN_spec N iff nparam ∩ ≡N vGVN N
Viewing the result of the analysis as a post-fixpoint is the key to our second
component, a validator that checks whether a numbering N is indeed a post-
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fixpoint of the analysis on a program p, and if so returns an optimized SSA
program tp. The validator is programmed in Coq, and is accompanied with a
proof that optimized programs preserve the behaviors of the original programs.
The crux of the correctness proof of the GVN validator is the correctness
lemma for a valid numbering: if N is a valid numbering for f, and rs is a
register state that can be reached at node pc, and x and y are two registers
whose definition strictly dominate pc, then N x = N y entails that rs holds
equal values for x and y:
Lemma valid numbering correct : ∀ prog s sp pc rs m,
wf ssa program prog→ GVN spec N→
reachable prog (State s f sp pc rs m)→ gamma N pc rs.
where gamma is defined by
Definition gamma (N:reg→ reg) (pc:node) (rs: regset) : Prop :=
∀ x y: reg, def sdom f x pc→ def sdom f y pc→ N x = N y→ rs#x = rs#y.
and def_sdom f x pc states that the definition of x in f strictly dominates
pc. The definition of def_sdom given below takes care of the case where x is
assigned in a φ-block at pc (noted assigned_phi f pc x). Indeed, a φ-block at
pc is actually executed before reaching pc while a normal assignement at pc will
takes effect after leaving pc.
Inductive def sdom (f:function) (x:reg) (pc:node) : Prop :=
| def sdom def sdom : ∀ def x,
def f x def x → sdom f def x pc→¬ assigned phi f pc x→ def sdom f x pc
| def sdom def phi :
assigned phi f pc x→ def sdom f x pc.
Let us illustrate the gamma property with Figure 3; registers x2 and y2 share
the same numbering; they are indeed equal just after the assignment of y2 but
not before.
Next, we describe the Coq implementation for optimizing SSA programs. The
implementation takes as input a numbering N , and a partial mapping crep that
takes as input a register x and node pc and returns, if it exists, a register y such
that x and y are related by the equivalence kernel of N , and the definition of y
strictly dominates pc. For efficiency reasons, we do not check the correctness of
crep a priori, but lazily during the construction of the optimized program. The
optimizer proceeds as follows: first, it checks whether N satisfies the predicate
GVN_spec. Then, for each assignment (Iop op args x pc) of the original SSA
program, the optimizer checks whether crep provides a canonical representative
y for x at node pc. If so, it checks whether the definition of y strictly dominates
pc; this is achieved by means of a dominance analysis, computed directly inside
Coq with a standard dataflow framework a la Kildall. Provided y is validated,
we can safely replace the previous instruction by a move from y to x.
We conclude by commenting briefly on the soundness proof of the trans-
formation. It follows a standard forward simulation proof where the correct-
ness of the numbering is proved at the same time as the simulation itself. No-
ticeably, the CFG normalization turned out to be extremely valuable for this
proof. Indeed, consider a step from node pc to node pc′: we have to prove that
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(gamma N pc′ rs) holds, asumming (gamma N pc rs). We reason by case analy-
sis: if the instruction at pc is not an Inop instruction, we know by normalization
that pc′ is not a junction point. In this case, (def_sdom f x pc′) is equivalent
to (def_sdom f x pc) ∨ (def f x pc) which is particularly useful to exploit the
hypothesis that (gamma N pc rs) holds.
8 Conversion out of SSA
The final phase of the middle-end converts SSA programs back to RTL programs,
so that they can be further processed by the CompCert back-end, starting with
register allocation. Several approaches have been proposed [30, 7]. As a first step,
we decided to use the conversion described in [16]. The basic idea of this conver-
sion is to substitute each φ-function with one variable copy at each predecessor
of the junction points:
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However, there are several pitfalls to avoid: performing naively the destruc-
tion of SSA by such copy insertions can lead to the non-preservation of behav-
iors. Two problems were identified by Briggs et al. in [10]: the presence of critical
back-edges (that can lead to the so-called lost-copy problem) and the swap prob-
lem. We review both problems in the next sections, and explain how we tackle
these two issues. As noted in [10], the swap problem is a particular case of the
lost-copy problem but we tackle the issues differently in our development. We
finish this section with an overview of the correctness proofs, that shows how
the normalization phase can be exploited.
8.1 Critical edges
In the presence of critical back-edges in the progran CFG, the simple copy inser-
tion described above becomes incorrect. We first recall the definition of a critical
edge.
Definition 7 (Critical edge). A critical edge is an edge (i, j) whose entry i
has several successors and whose exit j has several predecessors.
Figure 12a describes the situation where the exit of the critical edge (i, j)
holds a φ-block. The problem here is that, the copies cannot be inserted at the
predecessors, because they would be executed on some paths that initially did not
reach the φ-function. This can lead to the well-known lost-copy problem in the
presence of critical back-edges and optimizations such as copy folding (see [10]).
But copies cannot either be inserted at the edge sink, because it would overwrite
the values coming from the others predecessors.
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Fig. 12: Critical edges and naive copy insertion
One solution to this problem is to split critical edges, as shown in Figure 12b.
After the critical edge (i, j) has been splitted, the copies for replacing the φ-
function can be safely inserted at the predecessors of the node holding the block
(including the newly inserted node k). Compilers that operate on basic-block
CFG graphs carefully avoid edge splitting for efficiency concern in later opti-
mization stages. But this is at the cost of making de-SSA algorithms significantly
more complex.
In our case, the normalization we impose on SSA programs pleasingly en-
sures the absence of critical edges in their CFG. One could fear that the critical
edge splitting implied by the normalization could impact later phases of the
compiler, but the representation of programs inherited from CompCert deflates
this penalty cost. RTL graphs, and thus SSA code graphs, are single-instruction
graphs: replacing φ-functions with copies automatically splits critical edges by
the insertion of code.
8.2 The swap problem
One must also take care of the semantics of φ-blocks. They are given a parallel
semantics, and, because of optimizations, it is not in general equivalent to a se-
quential interpretation. Indeed, performing copy propagation on SSA can modify
the code, so that φ-functions argument and destination registers are no longer
independent: a variable xi can appear both as a source and a target of distinct
φ-functions in a single φ-block. In this case, the copies inserted for converting
out of SSA must be sequentialized. This can be done at the reasonable price of
inserting at most one temporary variable [29].
In the current state of our development, our conversion out of SSA fails on
such φ-blocks. This is not a limitation in practice, as the GVN optimization
we perform on the code does not cause problems of that kind; from the SSA
generation until its destruction, the parallel semantics of φ-blocks is ensured to
be equivalent to the sequential one. We however plan to reuse the work of Rideau
et al. [29] which provides an algorithm for transforming a set of parallel moves
into an equivalent sequence of elementary moves (using additional temporaries).
This algorithm is already used in CompCert when enforcing calling conventions
during the compilation of function calls.
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8.3 Correctness proof
For proving the transformation correct, we proceed by giving a forward plus
simulation between the SSA program and the RTL program after de-SSA. The
simulation requires the RTL program to perform several steps to simulate a (big-
step) execution of a φ-block by the initial SSA program. We also take advantage
of the normalization in this proof: the execution of an Inop instruction leading
to a junction point with a φ-block matches the corresponding inserted copies.
Without the normalization, all RTL-like instructions would have resulted in a
different case in the proof.
9 Implementation and experimental results
We have plugged in Compcert 1.8.2 our SSA middle-end made of (i) a Coq
normalization (ii) an OCaml SSA generator and its Coq validator; (iii) an OCaml
GVN inference tool and its Coq validator; (iv) a Coq de-SSA transformation.
Our formal development adds 15.000 lines of Coq code and 1.000 lines of OCaml
to the 80.000 lines of Coq and 1.000 lines of OCaml provided in CompCert. It
does not add any axioms to CompCert. We use the Coq extraction mechanism to
obtain an SSA-based certified compiler, that we evaluate experimentally using
the benchmark suite provided with the CompCert distribution. These include
around 75.000 lines of C code, and fall into three categories of programs (from 20
to 5.000 LoC): small computation kernels, a raytracer, and the theorem prover
Spass4. Below we briefly comment on three key points: efficiency of the SSA
validator; effectiveness of the GVN optimizer; efficiency of generated code.
9.1 Efficiency of SSA validator
In order to be practical, validators must be more efficient than state-of-the-art
implementations of the transformations that they validate. At first sight, this
criterion may seem too demanding for SSA, since generation into SSA form is
performed in almost linear time. However, experimental results are surprisingly
good: overall converting a program into SSA form takes approximately twice
longer than type-checking the output program. In more detail, the times for
SSA generation—specialized to pruned SSA—distribute as follows: (i) 9% for
normalization of RTL; (ii) 37% for liveness analysis of RTL (the liveness analysis
is provided in the CompCert distribution); (iii) 35% for conversion to SSA using
the untrusted OCaml implementation (based on state-of-the-art algorithms);
(iv) 19% for validation using the verified validator. This distribution appears to
be uniform on all benchmarks except on the biggest functions where the liveness
analysis exhibits a non-linear complexity.
9.2 Effectiveness of GVN optimizer
We measure the effectiveness of our GVN analyzer by performing a GVN-based
CSE right after a (Local Value Numbering) LVN-based CSE implemented in
4 Spass is the largest (69.073 LoC), we only use it to evaluate the compilation time.
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x86 PPC
Iop LVN GVN GVN Iop LVN GVN GVN
only only
c. kernels 3,494 163 55 216 3,142 422 54 472
raytracer 2,303 131 29 159 2,755 303 21 322
spass 51,640 122 19 99 52,451 392 43 306
TOTAL 57,437 416 103 474 58,348 1,117 118 1,100
Table 1: GVN optimizer (x86 and PowerPC backends) For each set of
benchmarks, we count the number of initial Iop in the RTL function (column
Iop), the number of Iop optimized away by the LVN-CSE optimization of Com-
pCert (column LVN) and the number of Iop optimized away by our GVN-CSE
optimization, right after CompCert’s LVN-CSE (column GVN). We also mea-
sure the number of Iop that GVN optimizes away without any prior LVN-CSE
(column GVN only).
CompCert. We count how many additional Iop instructions are optimized by
this additional CSE phase. For efficiency concerns about the generated code, we
need to keep the LVN phase that optimizes redundant memory loads (currently,
this is not done by our GVN optimizer). To keep the comparison fair, we allow
CompCert CSE to optimize around function calls—this is disabled in CompCert
to keep the register pressure low. The results are given in Table 1, for two
backends, x86 (left) and PowerPC (right). The overall improvement is significant.
Our global CSE optimizes an additional 10% of Iop instructions on PowerPC
and an additional 25% on x86.
We also measure how the GVN behaves, without the preliminary LVN op-
timization. Our global CSE manages to optimize all the Iop instructions that
are optimized by LVN, except 2 for the small computation kernels, and 1 for the
raytracer. For Spass, however, GVN only optimizes half the number of Iop. This
is due to the fact that in CompCert’s LVN, the redundant load elimination and
CSE optimizations are interdependent (detecting some redundant loads helps in
turn detecting new common sub-expressions, and common sub-expression elim-
ination can lead to extra load redundancy detection).
9.3 Efficiency of the Generated code
To assess the efficiency of the generated code, we have compiled the benchmarks
with three compilers: CompCert, our version of CompCert extended with a SSA
middle-end (CompCertSSA), and gcc − O1. Figure 13 gives the execution times
relative to Compcert (shorter bars mean faster) on PowerPC. The test suite
is too small to draw definite conclusions, but the results are encouraging. Our
version of CompCert performs slightly better than CompCert.
During our experiments, we observed that the computation time of the allo-
cator is sometimes rather long, and can result in a lot of spill code. The quality of
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Fig. 13: Execution times of generated code
the allocation is essentially impacted by our current SSA deconstruction, that in-
troduces many copies and artificial interferences between variables of a φ-block,
imposing more constraints on the allocator. We expect that performance im-
proves significantly by enhancing our middle-end with additional optimizations,
and by refining our SSA deconstruction, with either techniques similar to [7]
or an SSA-based register allocator [18]. We leave this interesting challenge for
future work.
10 Related Work
10.1 Machine-checked formalizations
Blech et al [6] use the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant to verify the generation of
machine code from a representation of SSA programs that relies on term graphs.
While graph-based representations may be useful for the untrusted parts of our
compiler, they increase the complexity of the formal SSA semantics, and make
it a greater challenge to verify SSA-based optimizations. They do not provide an
algorithm to convert into SSA form, and leave as future work proving the cor-
rectness of SSA-based optimizations. Mansky and Gunter [24] use Isabelle/HOL
to formalize and verify the conversion of CFG programs into SSA form. However,
their transformation may yield non-minimal SSA, and does not aim extraction
into efficient code. Moreover, it is not clear whether their semantics of SSA can
be used to reason about optimizations.
Zhao et al [37] formalize the LLVM SSA intermediate representation in Coq.
They define and relate several formal semantics of LLVM, including a static
and dynamic semantics. More recently [36], they verify an SSA generation al-
gorithm based on Aycock and Horspool algorithm [4]. This parallel work shares
some similarities with us concerning the semantics of φ-blocks and the SSA equa-
tional lemma. In contrast to our work, their SSA generation algorithm is directly
verified (and not a posteriori validated) but runs in quadratic time while our
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generator and its validator run in almost linear time thanks to the Lengauer-
Tarjan algorithm. Their SSA representation has not been used yet to verify a
representative SSA-based optimizations such as GVN.
Finally, there are several machine-checked accounts of Continuation Passing
Style translations, e.g. [17, 13], closely related to conversion to SSA form [3].
10.2 Translation validation and type systems
Menon et al [26] propose a type system that can be used to verify memory safety
of programs in SSA form, but their system does not enforce the SSA property.
Matsuno and Ohori [25] define a type system equivalent to SSA: every typable
program is given a type annotation makeing explicit def-use relations. Their type
system is similar to ours except they type check one program w.r.t. annotations
while we type check a pair of a RTL and a SSA program. They show that common
optimizations such as dead code elimination and CSE are type-preserving. But
they do not prove the semantics preservation of the optimizations. Stepp et
al [31] report on a translation validator for LLVM. Their validator uses Equality
Saturation [32], which views optimizations as equality analyses. Their tool does
not validate GVN. Tristan et al [33] independently report on an a translation
validator for LLVM’s inter-procedural optimizations. This tool supports GVN,
but is currently not certified.
11 Conclusion and Future Work
The SSA form is a popular IR in the compilation community that has been used
with great success in many program optimizations since its inception in the late
80’s. The structural properties of unique definition and strictness, as well as the
parallel semantics given to φ-blocks are the ingredients that led to this success.
If those properties seems rather simple and intuitive, the algorithms under-
lying the generation of SSA – who actually establish those properties – rely
on complex properties of graphs (e.g. the dominator tree or dominance fron-
tiers), that are difficult to justify formally. Moreover, the very semantics of the
SSA form has kept for a long time at an informal level. As a consequence, the
correctness proof of SSA-related algorithms (i.e. generation, optimizations, and
destruction), were until very recently not formally proved correct. Over the past
few years, some interesting attempts have be made to formalize the semantics of
SSA, but these formalizations were rather distant from the intuitive semantics
presented in the seminal papers. The correctness of SSA-based analyses and op-
timizations is usually proved using structural arguments on the CFG only, and
the semantic properties and invariants of SSA remain unclear.
In this paper, we have defined a formal semantics for SSA, that is both close
to the intuitive definition of the early papers, and amenable for formal reasoning,
as witnessed by our fully verified SSA-based middle-end for the verified Com-
pCert C compiler. Thanks to our choices made in the representation of programs,
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this semantics integrates well in the CompCert architecture. The translation val-
idation approach we use for the conversion to SSA and the GVN optimization
allows the middle-end implementing state-of-the-art algorithms, while keeping
close to the essence of those phases and to the high-level properties they should
satisfy in order to preserve the behaviors of programs. The focused nature of our
SSA validator makes it complete with regard to one of the reference implemen-
tations of the SSA generators [16], where φ-functions placement is determined
using dominance-frontiers. We also identified and isolated the semantic coun-
terpart of the structural properties of SSA into a dedicated invariant lemma –
that holds at all points of the execution – on which rely the correctness proof of
several SSA-based optimizations.
A priority for further work is to achieve a tighter integration of our middle-
end into CompCert. There are three immediate objectives: (i) enhancing our SSA
middle-end to handle memory aliases as done by CompCert’s RTL-based middle-
end, (ii) implementing an SSA-based register allocator [18], and (iii) verifying
more SSA-based optimizations, including PRE [14], or lazy code motion [20]—we
expect that our implementation of GVN will provide significant leverage there.
Eventually, it should be possible to shift all CompCert optimizations into the
SSA middle-end.
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